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Shareholders’ Council provide report to shareholders

Investor Presentation7 November 2018FSFConsumer Staples

NOVEMBER 2018
INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT

OF FONTERRA’S FINANCIAL

PERFORMANCE SINCE

INCEPTION

Fonterra Shareholders’ Council Values Review 2018
Fonterra Shareholders’ Council Values Review 2018

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In June your Council engaged Northington Partners to assess

Fonterra’s financial performance since its inception.


This work was in response to a heightened level of commentary

within the supplier base, media and the broader financial

community in relation to the perceived performance of our

Co-op since it was formed in 2001. Council saw benefit in

obtaining an independent and reliable view of actual performance

over the last 17 years based on sound methodology and having

access to relevant financial information.


This report provides a high-level summary of the results that is

clear and accessible to all of our Co-op members. We believe it

will be a useful input into the ongoing discussions about our

Co-op’s continued evolution.


It’s important to note that the review looked at just one part of

the overall returns that Farmers earn - their return on capital

invested in Fonterra. Fonterra’s role is far greater than this - as

set out in the Fonterra constitution. Fonterra exists to maximise

returns to farmers through Milk Price and dividend, and the

standalone performance of the Co-op is therefore only one

component of the overall returns achieved by Fonterra suppliers.


In simple terms, Fonterra effectively operates two businesses.

The Milk Price received by its Farmers is a measure of global

supply and demand for base milk ingredients and the efficiency

of converting that milk into those ingredients, whereas the share

value is a measure of the Co-op’s success in delivering value over

and above the Milk Price through time.


The assessment clearly shows that Fonterra’s financial

performance since inception has been unsatisfactory.


When considered as a stand-alone investment, the average

returns generated by Fonterra since inception are lower than

relevant benchmarks.


The assessment was deliberately restricted to a small number of

key metrics:

• Shareholder Returns – what annual returns have Farmer

Shareholders received from their investment in Fonterra

shares since Fonterra’s inception?

• Financial Performance – what Return on Capital has Fonterra

achieved from the business and how does this compare to

appropriate benchmarks?

• Segment Analysis – does Fonterra earn a higher

Return on Capital from its Value-Add business units?

Northington Partners believes that given the nature of the data

that is available for the full period, these metrics are the best

available and sufficient to provide an over-arching view.

The results are unambiguous. A range of alternative measures was

also examined but incorporating them in the assessment did not

add to or materially change the general conclusions.


Consistent with the agreed scope of the review, Northington

Partners has made no attempt to identify potential explanations

for the results. Nor do they offer any thoughts on possible

changes to improve performance.


Council’s view is that the information provided in this report

should inform a wider discussion between Board, Management

and Shareholders around the continued evolution of our Co-op

and in particular what can be done to ensure ongoing returns

meet, as a minimum, the opportunity cost of Farmers’ capital

invested in the Co-operative.


Notwithstanding the findings of this report, Council remains

firmly of the view that the co-operative structure is the only

structure that will provide for the enduring needs of our

intergenerational farming families. Our three key takeouts are:

1. Fonterra has failed to deliver meaningful returns over and

above the cost of capital since inception. Milk growth over

the past 15 years has been an impediment but is now largely

historical. It is critical that this be addressed to ensure

continued supply of milk and capital.

2. Milk price has and continues to be the greatest driver to on

farm profitability. The Milk Price Manual continues to drive

transparency and efficiency, placing increasing tension on

the business to deliver value over and above this. This is the

most appropriate tension for Farmers as suppliers of milk and

providers of capital. All dairy farmers in New Zealand benefit

from this irrespective of whom they supply.

3. Given the relationship between Milk Price and earnings it’s

important that Shareholders look at the total available for

payout as a true measure of performance over time.

Regards

Duncan Coull

Chairman

Fonterra Shareholders’ Council

*Northington Partners is an independent corporate advisory business. For the

last three years it has supported Council in its review of Fonterra’s annual and

half year results. It does not undertake any other work for Fonterra.

Executive Summary

From the Chairman

This report has been prepared by Northington Partners in conjunction with the Fonterra Shareholders’ Council solely for the purpose of

providing an independent view of Fonterra’s actual performance since its formation. It is based on publicly available information and

discussion with select members of Fonterra’s management. Nothing in the nature of an audit of any of that information has been performed.


In preparing this report Northington Partners and the Fonterra Shareholders’ Council, and their respective directors, councillors, employees

and representatives, have endeavoured to provide accurate analysis and supporting discussion that is not misleading in any way, and to

exercise reasonable care and judgement. However, no liability or responsibility is accepted for any errors or omissions, or for any

consequences arising from the use of, or reliance on, this report.

Metric ExaminedMeasured ByFonterra’s Performance

Shareholder ReturnsWhat was the average Total Shareholder

Return (Change in Share Price + Dividends) since

inception?

$1 invested in Fonterra would be worth

$2.84 today (before taxes), representing a

6.3% p.a. return

Financial PerformanceWhat was the average Return on Capital

Employed since inception and was this in line with

appropriate benchmarks?

Fonterra’s Return on Capital has averaged

6.0% p.a. (post-tax), which is lower than

the assessed benchmark of 6.9% - 7.7% p.a.

Segment PerformanceHow much higher was the Value-Add business

Return on Capital compared to the Ingredients

business, and was this sufficient to compensate for

the increased risks?

The Value-Add business returned 0.2% p.a.

more than Ingredients, significantly below

the 1.3% p.a. premium needed to justify the

increased risk.

Other Contributions to Farmer

Wealth

Farmers should also take into account:

1. The gap has closed between the NZ milk

price and international prices since Fonterra’s

formation.

2. There has been a significant increase in the

Milk Price since the inception of the Milk Price

Manual.

3. The value of farmland has increased since

Fonterra’s formation (even after adjusting for

productivity improvements on-farm).

4. Fonterra’s performance includes the impact of

ongoing support and stability during weak

economic conditions.

Dear Shareholders

Fonterra Shareholders’ Council Values Review 2018
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An investment in Fonterra shares has earned an average

pre-tax return of 6.3% p.a. since inception. This includes

the returns from both dividend payments and changes in

share value.

COUNCIL’S VIEW

Prior to the introduction of Trading Among Farmers

the value of a Fonterra share was determined by an

independent valuer (appointed by the Shareholders’

Council) who took a forward-looking approach using a

discounted cashflow methodology to determine a range

within which the Board chose the fair value of a share.

The structure of Trading Among Farmers, incorporating the

farmer only Fonterra Shareholders’ Market and the publicly

listed Fonterra Shareholders’ Fund, has facilitated a market

driven price for the fair value of a share.

One of the driving principles of Trading Among Farmers

was to ensure the Co-op had permanent capital to invest

in its strategy, eliminating the redemption risk to which

Fonterra was previously exposed. While Trading Among

Farmers has undoubtedly been a success in this respect,

the question must be asked as to whether this permanent

capital has been invested in assets that are generating an

appropriate risk-adjusted rate of return?

Fonterra has delivered an average post-tax Return on

Capital of 6.0% p.a. since 2001.

Shareholder Returns

What annual returns have Farmer Shareholders received from

their investment in Fonterra shares?

While not directly comparable in terms of risk profile, the

graph below summarises Fonterra’s performance relative

to the NZ sharemarket (NZX 50) as a whole. This shows

that the total Shareholder return for Fonterra has

fluctuated considerably through time, particularly since

2012 when Trading Among Farmers was introduced and

units in the Fonterra Shareholders’ Fund were listed.

Financial Performance

What Return on Capital has Fonterra achieved from the business?

The graph below shows that performance is volatile year-

to-year and is generally negatively correlated with the Milk

Price.

EXPLANATION

Q: Why have you compared Fonterra’s Total Shareholder

Return to the NZ Sharemarket (NZX 50)?

A: This comparison is to provide some general context for

Fonterra’s performance only, and is not meant to suggest

that the two are directly comparable. Arguably Fonterra’s

risk profile means it should be expected to deliver a lower

return than the sharemarket as a whole, but we think the

comparison with the sharemarket helps suppliers put

Fonterra’s performance into context.

Q: Why didn’t you compare Fonterra with other dairy

co-operatives and companies?

A: Fonterra is very different to other entities in the NZ

dairy sector and it’s not possible to accurately adjust for the

fundamental differences in order to provide a meaningful

comparison to most of the other entities. Comparisons

with the total shareholder returns for international dairy

processors are difficult for similar reasons, but also because

most of those businesses are not listed and we can’t

accurately measure share price performance.

A comparison of Fonterra’s performance on the basis of

Return on Capital is set out on page 9.

COUNCIL’S VIEW

Volatility of milk price has had, and will continue to have,

an impact on Fonterra’s earnings from year to year because

the Milk Price is the most significant contributor to cost

of sales. Greater transparency over the determination

of the Milk Price since the introduction of the Milk Price

Manual regime has added to the annual volatility. Farmers

generally understand and accept this relationship.

It is relevant to acknowledge the 45% increase in milk

collections from 1,110 m kgMS (2001/2002) to a peak of

1,614m kgMS (2014/15) since Fonterra’s inception (1,505m

kgMS (2017/2018)). Appropriate investments have had

to be made to accommodate this growth and to find

competitive markets for the increased volume of product

sales, which have largely been very successful.

However, even allowing for some of these contributing

factors, it remains clear that Fonterra has generated lower

returns on capital over recent years. Given the heightened

competition for milk in New Zealand Fonterra needs to

do better in order to earn the trust of Farmers’ milk and

capital.

EXPLANATION

Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) assesses how well

capital has been invested. It is calculated as:

Q: What is the difference between Book and Market

Value, and how does this impact the Return on Capital

Employed (ROCE) calculation?

A: Book value is the value of equity in Fonterra’s financial

statements. Market Value is the value that people are

willing to pay for Fonterra’s equity, as reflected in its

traded share price. As Market Value is typically higher than

Book Value, the ROCE calculation is lower if it is based on

Market Value.

Ideally, ROCE is calculated on Market Value as that is more

representative of the wealth of shareholders invested

in the business. However, when comparing segments or

against competitors who are not listed themselves, Book

Value must be used to ensure consistency.

Return on Capital and Farmgate Milk Price

Post-Tax Return on Capital

%

8%

6%

%

%

%

Farmgate Milk Price (right axis)

Milk Price introduced in   bringing a transparent

framework for determining the Milk Price and earnings

Average Return on Capital Employed

since inception of 6. % p.a.

Return on Capital Employed

Milk Price

Trading among Farmers and the listing of units in

the Fonterra Shareholders’ Fund - November  

FY  FY  FY  FY  FY 6 FY  FY 8 FY  FY FY FY FY FY FY FY6 FY FY8

‰.‰%

Š. %

‰.%

‰.‹%

.%

Š.%

‹.%

.‹%

. %

.8%

‹.Š%

‹. %

6.Š%

‰.6%

6. %




$6


$


$

$

$-

‹.Š%

‹.%

ROCE = Earnings before interest and tax x ( e ective tax rate)

market value of capital employed

Total Shareholder Return

FY FY FY FY FY

FY6 FY FY8 FY FY FY FY FY FY FY

FY6 FY FY8

FonterraNZ Sharemarket (NZX )

Milk Price introduced in  bringing a transparent

framework for determining the Milk Price and earnings

Value of  Invested since

inception (before taxes)

Introduction of Trading Among Farmers

and the listing of units in the Fonterra

Shareholders’ Fund - November 

$‡.‰

.6% p.a.

$.8‡

6.Ž% p.a.

$6

$



$


$

Fonterra Shareholders’ Council Values Review 2018
Fonterra Shareholders’ Council Values Review 2018

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EXPLANATION

Segment Analysis

The average post-tax return Return on Capital employed by the

Fonterra business of 6.0% p.a. is materially lower than the estimated

return benchmark range of 6.9% - 7.7% p.a. Average returns on

capital have also deteriorated over the last five years.


This differential is material when considered over the full 17-year

period, amounting to an opportunity cost of over $2 billion in

foregone earnings. In simple terms, this is the gap between the

returns actually achieved by Fonterra and the benchmark cost of

capital over time.


If the impact of the Milk Price improvements since 2009 are added

back, the average Return on Capital Employed over the last 10 years

increases by 0.7% – with this adjustment, the outcome is marginally

higher than the bottom end of the benchmark WACC range.

See Appendix 1 for more detail.

Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) assesses how well capital

has been invested. It is calculated as:

Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) combines the cost

of debt and equity capital that has been used to fund Fonterra’s

business. WACC reflects the return that should have been

earned to compensate investors for the risk associated with their

investment. If:

• ROCE exceeds WACC the company has created

shareholder value.

• ROCE is lower than WACC the business has

underperformed and investors have effectively suffered a

notional loss.


Q: Why have you used a range for the benchmark WACC?

A: There has been significant debate between Fonterra

stakeholders as to what an appropriate cost of capital should be

for the business. Due to this, we believe it is more meaningful

to provide a range for the benchmark WACC, and we have done

this drawing from the wealth of analysis behind all sides of the

debate.

The difference between the low and high points of our

benchmark WACC range is the assumed Asset Beta for the

Value-Add segment of the business: 0.51 at the low point and

0.75 at the high point.

COUNCIL’S VIEW

The opportunity cost of around $2 billion is reflective of the Co-op’s

inability to generate Shareholder value over and above the cost of

capital for its owners. The 28.3 cents increase in the Milk Price since

FY09 arising from Milk Price calculation method changes has been a

key driver of this over the past five years, as has the impact of events

such as the Beingmate impairment and Danone arbitration costs.

Prior to 2009 and the introduction of the Milk Price Manual it could

be argued Farmers were being underpaid for their milk.

A separate assessment of the return from different

segments of the Fonterra business is not straightforward

given ongoing changes to internal reporting structures

and some significant data limitations. However, the

available data does allow an examination of returns for the

Ingredients and Value-Add segments since inception.


The analysis shows that the Value-Add segment of

Fonterra’s business has generated a return that is only

Q: Why was Total Shareholder Return (on page 4) considered

on a pre-tax basis, while Return on Capital was considered on

a post-tax basis?

A: It would generally be preferable to calculate both metrics on a

pre-tax basis as the marginal tax rate for Fonterra’s shareholders

may individually differ. However, our WACC benchmark for Return

on Capital performance is typically determined as a post-tax rate.

It is simpler and generally more accurate to convert the Return on

Capital to a post-tax measure, than it is to convert the WACC to an

equivalent pre-tax measure.

Q: Why is Return on Capital for FY18 different from Fonterra’s

reported FY18 Return on Capital?

A: Our FY18 Return on Capital is based on actual EBIT, while

Fonterra’s reported FY18 Return on Capital is based on normalised

EBIT. In addition, Fonterra’s capital base uses more detailed

(monthly) figures that are not publicly available, while our capital

base is measured using the average of year-end balances.

How does Fonterra’s Return on

Capital compare to appropriate

benchmarks?

Q: Why is Return on Capital calculated on actual rather than

normalised EBIT?

A: Normalised EBIT is used to compare year-to-year performance

by excluding the impact of one-off factors. However, analysis of

performance over a long period of time should include the impact

of these one-off items as they ultimately have resulted in increases

or decreases to Fonterra’s value and therefore the value of shares

in Fonterra.

Q: Why did you use actual EBIT rather than spread one-off

impacts over multiple years?

A: We acknowledge that it may be theoretically more accurate

to spread a one-off impact over the time the impact was accrued

(e.g. spreading the Beingmate impairment across each year since

the FY15 investment). However, this requires assumptions around

the timing of the one-off items and leads to a trade-off between

meaningfulness and complexity. The impact of smoothing these

impacts through time does not have a meaningful impact on the

overall assessed returns.

Does Fonterra earn a higher Return on Capital from its

Value-Add business units?

0.2% p.a. higher than the Ingredients segment.

This premium is far lower than the estimated 1.3% margin

that is required to compensate investors for the higher risk

profile associated with the Value-Add business (based on

the WACC framework). Recent returns in the

Value-Add business segment have been severely affected by

the Beingmate impairment.

EXPLANATION

The above analysis broadly illustrates that Fonterra has

not generated sufficient additional return on its Value-Add

business.


This is important because the Value-Add business units are

now using an increasing share of Fonterra’s capital. For the

first five years since inception (FY02 – FY06), the

Value-Add business accounted for 36% of Fonterra’s

capital. This has increased to 50% of Fonterra’s capital

over the last 5 years (FY14 - FY18).

Segment Post-Tax Return on Capital Employed (based 0n book values) since inception

Segment Return on Capital Employed vs Segment Weighted Average Cost of Capital Benchmark

ROCE - Ingredients

%

 %

 %

8%

6%

%

%

%

- %

8%

6%

%

%

%

 %

8%

6%

%

%

%

ROCE - Value-Add

Average Ingredients ROCE = 6.%

Average Value-Add ROCE = 6.%

ROCE WACC ROCE WACC ROCE WACC

Since InceptionLast  YearsLast € Years

ROCE WACC ROCE WACC ROCE WACC

Since InceptionLast  YearsLast € Years

.8%

FY­€ FY­‚ FY­ƒ FY­„ FY­6 FY­† FY­8 FY­ˆ FY‰­ FY‰‰ FY‰€ FY‰‚ FY‰ƒ FY‰„ FY‰6 FY‰† FY‰8

.%

.%

6.€%

.%

. %

.%

€.%€.%

6.€%

8. %

6.%

‚.8%

‚.%

.8%

6. %

-.%

.€%

. %

.%

.‚%

€.8%

.‚%

.€%

.8%

€.‚%

€.%

.%

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‚.€%

. %

6.%

8.%

6. %

6.%

6. %

6.%

6.8%

€.6%

6.8%

6.%

. %

6.%

. %

6.6%

6. %

8.%

8.‚%

.%

Ingredients Post-Tax ROCE WACC

Value-Add Post-Tax ROCE WACC - Low

WACC - High


However, we should also note that recent investment

in consumer brands and other value-add opportunities

represents a long-term proposition that may take some

time to generate the expected outcomes. For example, the

initial investment in China was expected to be loss-making

in its early years, before generating target returns after the

business matures and reaches the required scale. Higher

returns from these investments may yet be realised.

ROCE = Earnings before interest and tax x ( e ective tax rate)

market value of capital employed

COUNCIL’S VIEW

Average Post-Tax Return on Capital Employed vs

Weighted Average Cost of Capital Benchmark

%

8%

6%

%

%

%

Fonterra Post-Tax ROCE WACC - Low WACC - High

Since Fonterra’s Inception Last  Years Last ­ Years

Post-Tax WACC

ROCE

Post-Tax WACC

ROCE

Post-Tax WACC

ROCE

6.‚%

6.%

6.%

­.8%

.6%

­.8%

ƒ.ƒ%

6.6%

ƒ.%

Value Gap of .‚% - .ƒ% vs WACC

Fonterra Shareholders’ Council Values Review 2018
Fonterra Shareholders’ Council Values Review 2018

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The differential between the Ingredients segment and Value-Add

segment return on capital is the key metric to consider as opposed

to their individual values. Note that the group return on capital (as

described on page 3) has been calculated based on market values

of capital, but the segment returns have been calculated based on

book values. As a result, the segment returns on capital are both

higher than the group return on capital.

Fonterra’s reported operating segments have changed significantly

since inception in 2001 as outlined in the table below.


A high-level segmentation enables an assessment of Fonterra’s

ability to create value for farmers through operations beyond the

collection, processing and sale of NZ milk.

For the purposes of this Segment Analysis aspect of the

assessment:

- The Ingredients segment means the Commodity business

(including advanced ingredients) in NZ only, plus general

group costs.

- The Value-Add segment means all other businesses,

including Consumer & Foodservice, China Farms and

international milk pools.

We have included an adjustment to reflect assets held by the

Ingredients segment but actually used for the benefit of the

Value-Add segment.


This segmentation was applied due to the historical reporting and

availability of financial information.

ROCE = see explanation on page 6

Benchmarks = WACC as explained on page 6.

EXPLANATION

Major Reporting Change in FY8 Strategic Platforms Introduced in FY

FY FY FY FY FY6 FY FY8 FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY6 FY

New Zealand

Commodity Segment

(”Ingredients”)

Value-Add Segment

(”Value-Add”)

NZ Milk ProductsIngredients

Commodities

& Ingredients

NZ Milk

Products

Global

Ingredients &

Operations (GIO)

Standard &

Premium

Ingredients

New Zealand

Milk

Consumer

Australia and New Zealand Oceania

Asia

Greater China

Asia / Africa and Middle East AME Asia

Latin America

Fonterra is very different to the other entities operating

in the New Zealand dairy sector due to a range of factors,

and we therefore believe that a direct comparison of each

company’s performance is misleading. Key differences

include:

• Obligation to Supply: Fonterra’s historic obligation

to supply competitors means that it effectively

internalises some production and volume risks on

behalf of its competitors.

• Open Entry vs Catchment: Tatua and Westland

purchase from a very limited catchment with unique

economics. Synlait and OCD have the ability to

change their catchment over time to suit their needs.

Fonterra is however obliged to collect from an

extensive catchment.

• Scale: Fonterra collects approximately 12 times as

much milk as OCD, 25 times as much as Synlait and

102 times as much as Tatua. Given its scale Fonterra is

more exposed to international commodity prices and

market fluctuations.

• Product Mix: The product mix of each of Fonterra,

OCD, Synlait, Westland and Tatua differs – there is a

mix of higher and lower proportions of commodity

products.

Comparable dairy company analysis

Pre-Tax Return on Capital Employed

.%

.%

.%

.%

.%

Since Fonterra’s Inception Last  Years Last  Years

Fonterra Arla Friesland Campina

8.%

8.%

8.%

8.%

6.8%

8.%

.%

.%

.6%

As a result of the clear differences in scale and scope of

the businesses, comparing Fonterra’s performance to its

NZ competitors is generally considered to be potentially

misleading because it is not possible to accurately adjust

for the differences outlined above.

Of the local processors, OCD is arguably the most

comparable to Fonterra because it is the largest

competitor and is predominantly focused on commodity

ingredients. Over the last 10 years OCD has delivered an

average pre-tax Return on Capital Employed of 7.0% p.a.,

which is lower than Fonterra’s equivalent return of

8.3% p.a. over the same period (based on book values.)

Arguably more comparable entities to Fonterra can be

found overseas. The most similar businesses to Fonterra

globally are Arla and Friesland Campina, both farmer

co-operatives (based in Denmark and the Netherlands

respectively) with substantial commodity and consumer

operations. However, neither company is subject to the

same regulatory regime as Fonterra.

Comparison is best measured by pre-tax return on capital

employed to control for tax differences in overseas

jurisdictions.

Based on the book value of Capital Employed for all three

entities, Fonterra’s historical performance has been in line

with Arla, achieving similar returns on capital both since

inception and over the last 10 years. However, Fonterra’s

performance has been significantly lower than Friesland

Campina’s across all comparable time periods.

Source: Company Annual reports

NZ Milk Collections by Share

Fonterra

, kgMS collected in

 /8 season

OCD

8% of

Fonterra Volumes

Synlait

%

Westland

%

Tatua

%

Fonterra Shareholders’ Council Values Review 2018
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The Milk Price Manual was introduced in FY09 to support

a transparent approach for calculating the Farmgate Milk

Price. The calculation methodology for the Farmgate

Milk Price is adjusted each year to ensure that it reflects

a value that an efficient processor would pay for milk,

and is in compliance with the Milk Price Principles in the

Constitution and the milk price requirements in the Dairy

Industry Restructuring Act 2001 (DIRA). These changes

can be split into items attributable to Fonterra

(e.g. efficiency gains) and items attributable to wider

market conditions (e.g. changes in market interest rates).

The cumulative impact of these changes since FY09

is 51.8 cents/kgMS. That means that if no adjustments

were made to the methodology, the FY18 Milk Price

would be 51.8 cents/kgMS lower. Of this total amount,

28.3 cents is attributable to improvements in Fonterra’s

performance and 23.5 cents to wider market conditions.

(We note that the 2018 Milk Price Statement states

Appendix 1 - Impact of Milk Price

Manual Changes

29.6 cents is attributable to Fonterra, but this includes a 1.3

cents impact from a change in Asset Beta, which we view as a

market condition change). While for a standard company these

improvements would increase its earnings, for Fonterra this

effectively represents a 28.3 cents increase in the Milk Price

since FY09. It is therefore important to consider what Fonterra’s

earnings and returns would have been prior to the impact of

these changes to the Milk Price.

We have adjusted the Return on Capital Employed calculation

by adding the improvements in Milk Price back into Fonterra’s

earnings. These results are summarised in the chart below and

show that the impact in some years since FY13 is material.

If these changes to the Milk Price had not been made, Fonterra’s

Return on Capital since inception would increase from 6.0% to

6.4%. Similarly, the Return on Capital for both the last 5-year

period and the last 10-year period would be marginally above

the bottom end of the benchmark WACC range.

We note that this analysis represents an estimate, meant

to provide a general indication of the value transfer, rather

than a precise calculation, due to the following factors:

• Although the changes to the Milk Price calculation

methodology started in FY09, the impact of the

changes did not start being disclosed until FY13.

• A comprehensive breakdown of the changes is only

available for FY16 and FY18. The value of the changes

for other years has been estimated based on Milk Price

Statement disclosures.

• The analysis is based on simplifying assumptions in

relation to the value of capital employed and the

taxation treatment of the incremental earnings.

Return on Capital and Farmgate Milk Price with Adjustments for Milk Price Manual Methodology

Changes Attributable to Fonterra

Post-Tax Return on Capital

%

8%

6%

%

%

%

Adjusted Return on Capital

Total Value $ m $ m $ 6 m $m $m $6m

Return on Capital Employed

Changes made since FY 

but not disclosed until FY 

.8c .c . c 6.c .c 8.c

Value of Methodology

Changes Attributable to Fonterra

FY FY FY FY FY6 FY FY8 FY­ FY€ FY€€ FY€ FY€ FY€ FY€ FY€6 FY€ FY€8

.%

. %

.%

.%

.%

.%.%

.%

.%

. %

.8%

.%.%

. %

6.%

.6%

6. %

.%

.%

8.%

6.%

.%

6. %

Average Post-Tax Return on Capital Employed

(Adjusted for Milk Price Manual Changes)

vs Weighted Average Cost of Capital Benchmark

8%

6%

%

%

%

     6  8 

Fonterra Post-Tax ROCE Adjusted ROCE

WACC - Low WACC - High

6.%

6.%

6.%

.%

.8%

.6%

6.%

.%

6.%

.8%

6.6%

.%

Support/stability in weak economic conditions

The Co-op exists for the benefit of its Farmer Shareholders.

As such, it looks to maximise the sustainable value of the

milk supplied by Shareholders.

From time to time the Co-op provides other benefits to its

Shareholders to support the ongoing sustainability of their

businesses. Recent examples include:

• The Co-op support loan which provided an additional

4 cents per kgMS through relief of working capital on

farm.

• The introduction of the Farm Source model and its

Rewards programme which has rewarded Shareholders

who purchase farm supplies exclusively through Farm

Source stores at around 10 cents per kgMS annually.

• On-farm support through in-house sustainabilty

programmes supporting farmers in developing

comprehensive farm environment plans free of charge

for Shareholders.

The Bigger Picture

Apart from the investment returns, to what extent has Fonterra

directly or indirectly impacted farmer wealth?

Average Sale Price for Dairy Land

2000/012001/022002/032003/042004/052005/062006/072007/082008/092009/102010/112011/122012/132013/142014/15

2015/16

2016/17

$,

$,

$,

$,

$,

$,

$,

$,

,

$

$8

$

$6

$

$

$

$

$

$

Average Land Price per Ha Average Land Price

per kgMS Produced (right axis)

Difference attributable

to productivity gains

.% p.a. growth

6.% p.a. growth

Land value appreciation

Farmers have also benefited considerably from increases

in their land value over the period since Fonterra’s

inception. When considered across all regions, land value

appreciation has averaged 6.0% p.a. for the last

17 years and these capital gains have been a fundamental

driver of improvements in farmer’s net wealth position.

While productivity improvements have contributed

approximately half of this value, some of the benefit can

also reasonably be attributed to Fonterra’s significant role

in the sector.

Milk Price Performance

There has been an historical gap between the milk price

achieved in New Zealand compared to the milk price

received by farmers in the European and US markets.

Since Fonterra’s formation, NZ’s milk prices have

increasingly correlated with these benchmark markets,

and this price gap has now closed.

While it is not possible to gauge the degree to which

Fonterra has explicitly effected this improvement in prices,

Farmer Shareholders should recognise that improvements

in Fonterra’s business may be reflected in stronger Milk

Prices rather than increased earnings as previously

discussed.


The Milk Price Manual has provided a greater level of

transparency of the cost of goods for the business.

The introduction of Global Dairy Trade has provided a true

market signal, both internally and externally, of the market

value for milk off farm.


Council’s view is that the Milk Price model is the greatest

driver of efficiency in the business and the greatest

determinant to on farm profitability.


As Shareholders we should always look to total Shareholder

return as the measure of performance of our Co-op.

Jan-8 Jan-8 Jan- Jan- Jan- Jan- Jan- Jan- Jan-

EU US NZ

Average Milk Prices Achieved

(US per LME)


$.

$.6

$. 

$. 

$.



$. 

$.

$.

Milk Price Model implemented

Formation of Fonterra

Source: DairyNZ

Data sourced from publicly available filings. Our datasets may not be complete. Automated analysis can produce errors. If you believe any data on this page is incorrect, please contact us at hello@nzxplorer.co.nz. For informational purposes only. Not investment advice.

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